

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 PEKING 00156 240735 Z

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12

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R 240236 Z MAY 73

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 136

S E C R E T PEKING 0156

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: MARQUIS CHILDS' INTERVIEW WITH CHOU EN- LAI

1. CHILDS REPORTS FOLLOWING POINTS MADE IN 3 AND 1/2 HOUR INTERVIEW WITH CHOU MAY 2.
2. CHOU LAMENTED THE FACT THAT DULLES HAD DELAYED THE INTERVIEW FOR SO MANY YEARS ( CHILDS WAS AMONG 20 NEWSMEN RECEIVING VISAS BUT PREVENTED FROM TRAVELING BY USG IN 1954). CHOU SAID HE HAD IN FACT LEARNED MUCH FROM " NEGATIVE SOURCES": DULLES, CHIANG AND KHRUSHCHEV. HE SAID U. S. FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS A GREAT GAP BETWEEN SOVIETS AND CHINESE IN TIME OF DULLES. DULLES, THE MAN, WAS GONE BUT THE EFFECT OF HIS POLICIES HAS NOT GONE. HE MENTIONED DULLES' FAILURE SHAKE HANDS WITH HIM IN GENEVA.
3. CHOU SAID PASSAGE OF SOVIET WARSHIPS THROUGH TAIWAN STRAIT WAS TO " BUG U. S. NOT CHINA". COMPLAINED THAT U. S. SPOKESMAN HAD IMMEDIATELY STATED THAT WE HAD NEVER CEASED PATROLLING TAIWAN STRAIT. IN ANY EVENT IT WAS GOOD THAT CHIANG KEPT TROOPS ON THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS FOR OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE LESS OF A LINK BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE MAINLAND. DULLES' OBJECTIVE, IN FACT, WAS AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN. HE WAS " FOND OF PRACTICING BRINKMANSHIP WITHOUT A BRINK."

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SECRET

PAGE 02 PEKING 00156 240735 Z

RM IN ASKING RHETORICALLY HOW U. S. COULD SETTLE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM, CHOU OBSERVED THAT SOVIETS HAD THE HABIT OF COMING INTO A VACUUM CREATED BY CIVIL WARS. CHOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE REQUIREMENT TO STAND BY OLD FRIENDS BUT LON NOL WAS A VERY NEW FRIEND. CHIAO KUAN- HUA ADDED " AND A VERY SMALL FRIEND". CHOU SAID " YOU ARE SACRIFICING LARGE ISSUES FOR SMALL PLACES".

5. CHOU SAID THAT WHILE CHINA WAS A VERY GREAT POTENTIAL POWER IT WAS " NOT AN EXISTING POWER". NEVERTHELESS, CHINA HAD GOTTEN OUT FROM UNDER A U. S. THREAT AND WAS PREPARED AGAINST ANY SOVIET THREAT. HE IMPLIED JAPAN WAS STILL A CONCERN SINCE IT WAS AT A CROSSROADS, UNDECIDED WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW ECONOMIC ROAD OR TURN MORE TO A MILITARY COURSE. CHOU CONSIDERED THAT WHEN A NATION BECOMES ECONOMICALLY POWERFUL, IT TENDS TO RELY ON MILITARY POWER ALSO.

6. CHOU SAID THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA WERE DEFINITELY HEADED TOWARD COMPLETE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. ( LATER HE SAID CHINA NEEDED U. S. EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.) IN VIEW OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH BOTH U. S. AND JAPAN, CHINA SHOULD BE " MORE AT EASE" BUT COULD NOT BE BECAUSE COULD NOT TRUST THE RUSSIANS. CHOU DID NOT AGREE WITH ALSOP THAT WAR WITH USSR WAS INEVITABLE BUT CHINA WAS PREPARED ANYWAY. SOVIETS WOULD NEVER GIVE UP THEIR ATTEMPTS FOR HEGEMONY, ENCE NO ONE COULD AFFORD TO RELAX. WESTERN TROOP REDUCTION IN EUROPE WOULD BE UNWISE . HE REFERRED TO SOVIET LEND- LEASE REPAYMENT AS " TINY".

7. CHOU AGREED WITH CHILDS THAT WESTERN EUROPE HAD NOT CARRIED ITS SHARE OF THE BURDEN, SAYING THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF FRANCE, " BUT THE AFP MAN TO WHOM I TOLD THIS DID NOT REPORT IT."

8. CHOU SAID " WE RESPECT PRESIDENT NIXON BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN FRANK WITH US. WE KNOW HE IS A RIGHTIST BUT HIS KANSAS CITY SPEECH WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT HE FACES REALITY. CHOU SHRUGGED OFF WATERGATE AS DOMESTIC MATTER.

9. CHOU SAID CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAD BEEN SALUTARY AND, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, ANOTHER ONE IN FUTURE WAS CONCEIVABLE BECAUSE " YOU CANNOT TRIUMPH BY WAGING ONE REVOLUTION. A REVOLUTION CAN GO BACKWARD."

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SECRET

PAGE 03 PEKING 00156 240735 Z

10. ON SUBJECT OF TAIWAN CHOU SAID " IF CHIANG' S SON HOPES FOR SEPARATE NATIONHOOD, WE WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE IT OUR OWN WAY BUT WE WANT TAIWAN ISSUE TO BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS".  
BRUCE

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NMAFVVZCZ

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